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Mineriade - 1999
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(Excerpt from the Renaissance 2000 Strategy©
- Appendix -White Paper Analysis - Political
Economy of Lupeni/Jiu Valley)
The
1997 Jiu Valley government’s
announcement of the closures of the Dalja and Barbateni mines and the generally deteriorating conditions of the miners
initially sparked riots and then
led to a general strike.
While such reaction was fairly predictable, the government was required to
close more mines (142 which had been closed since 1997) and was pending
decision on closing additional 112 mines
in order to be eligible
for an IMF loan to repay its debts.
Losses in the
unprofitable mining sector were then running at $370 million, and during the
course of 1997 the government had already
closed about 100 mines and
eliminated 90,000 mining jobs, including 20,000 in the Jiu Valley.
However, to limit further financial
losses, the government
made an announcement just before Christmas 1998 of its plan to close
non-profitable mines. Iplementing this new plan would result in firing additional 6,500
miners. [Anca Doicin, 1999, Le Monde Diplomatique.]
The result, not surprising, was an outpouring of miner resentment and anger
at what the miners saw as another betrayal. Organized by union leader Miron
Cozma, on 20 January 1999 an estimated 10-15,000 set out on another
mineriade from the Jiu Valley to Bucureşti to force the government to
change its policy, demand wage increases and re-opening of recently closed
mines. Along the way the caravan of miners fought pitched and bloody,
tear-gas choked battles with the police and wrecked havoc along the way. The
army was mobilized and waited on the outskirts of Bucharest. The anticipated
and dreaded showdown between the miners and army, however, never
materialized. The miners had not reached Bucureşti when a secret compromise
was reached between union leader Cozma and Prime Minister Radu Vasile on 22
January. In return for the miners’ agreement to turn around and go back to
the Jiu Valley, the government agreed to a 30 percent pay rise, re-opening
of two previously closed mines, and the spending of hundreds of millions of
European Union development funds on projects in the Jiu Valley. The
agreement may well have averted an eruption by disaffected workers in other
industries.
To many the compromise agreement was seen as a Pyrrhic victory for both
sides. While the government avoided a showdown with the miners, the
compromise represented “a potentially devastating setback to the
government’s flagging efforts to push through market-oriented reforms -
including the closure of 140 loss-making coalmines, 49 loss-making state
enterprises and a five-year plan to restructure the steel industry with the
loss of 70,000 jobs.” [ Financial Times, London, 23-4 January 1999] As for
the miners the future was no more certain than it was before the strike.
The agreement made Cozma a hero in the Jiu Valley, but within a month of his
return he was arrested and put in prison as a result of a decision of the
Romanian Supreme Court, an action seen by most miners as political revenge
by the government. For his role in the 1991 mineriade Cozma had been
convicted and sentenced to prison for three years, of which he had served
eighteen months before being released in 1998. After the January
mineriade, despite his apparent agreement Cozma continued to press for
new concessions from the government and announced another strike. In its
decision the Supreme Court increased Cozma’s sentence to 18 years for
“undermining state power” in the 1991 mineriade, along with the
charge of illegal possession of a firearm. Cozma defied the government to
arrest him, but soon thereafter, although protected by a convoy of several
thousand miners, Cozma and over 500 miners were arrested in a bloody clash
with the police. Several weeks later, already imprisoned, Cozma was
convicted on two other unrelated charges.
- JBG/3.23.05
(click
here to access the rest of the text in PDF format).
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